Interim Report (KEMA)

20 December 2011
Energie-Control Austria, Rudolfsplatz 13a, 1010 Wien

Entry-Exit Tariff Setting

Questions to market players:

The presented concept contains an option for a single capacity marketer incl. an inter-TSO compensation mechanism. How do market participants see this option and are there alternative approaches?

With a direct allocation of network costs to storages, how do market participants see the network charges at storage sites set solely on the basis of annual capacity products? Should network charges reflect the individual usage of the storages (e.g. through short-term capacity products)?
Inhowfar do market participants consider the offer of non-firm capacity products, e.g. in the form of interruptible capacity products with several different classes of probability for interruption to be acceptable?

How do market participants see capacities with a limitation on the free allocability? Are these capacities necessary to ensure a sufficient amount of firm capacity? Do market participants consider that other instruments as for example load flow commitments or interruptible capacity products could achieve the same result?

How do market participants see the potential for load flow commitments in Austria and how would they need to be designed?

How do market participants see the application of seasonality factors for short term capacity products?

Balancing

Questions to market players:

Questions under the assumption of separated balancing systems for the transmission system and the distribution area
(Under this model, a daily balancing regime is applied only at transmission level following the European rules in framework guidelines and network codes. In the distribution area, the current balacing system and gas day will remain unchanged)

In case of different prices for balancing energy at transmission and distribution level, how can individual optimisation strategies by network users that negatively affect the overall system stability be avoided?

At transmission level, shall tolerances be applied for balancing groups? How should they be designed (e.g. hourly or cumulative) and how high should they be?

Questions under the assumption of a single balancing system for market area
(Under this model, a daily balancing regime is applied for the whole market area that meets the requirements of the underlying physical network)

Shall there be specific levy accounts for different customer groups for within-day balancing? How do market participants see a freedom of choice for network users to opt for a certain type of customer group related within-day balancing system versus a compulsory classification?

In case of different prices for balancing energy in neighbouring market areas, how can individual optimisation strategies by network users that negatively affect the Austrian system stability be avoided?

Shall within-day obligations be determined on an hourly or cumulative basis?

Questions for both models

Which publication and information obligations are necessary to meet the goal of a market-based balancing regime?

On which basis shall tolerances be calaculated?

Do market participants prefer a balancing regime with an obligation to balance forecasted flows close to real time or a balancing regime which allows ex-post balancing under certain circumstances?

Should tolerances be applied that reflect the degree of stability of the overall network? Shall network users have incentives to contribute to overall system balancing?