



# E-CONTROL

WORKING FOR YOU – WHEREVER YOU NEED ENERGY.

# Summary I

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- First session about coordination between grid and generation investment
  - Coordination hard to achieve but leads to public procurement and socialisation of the investment risk
  - Who is to decide?
  - Coordination via price signals as alternative (zonal prices)
  - Who is best to take investment decisions and bear involved risks

# Summary II

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- Second session is about two potential reasons for interference in generation: investment in generation in view of more intermittency and problem of load pockets
  - There are theoretical arguments in favour of capacity elements in future electricity markets
  - The discussion shows well the huge diversity of mechanisms. A general discussion is not appropriate, also a general introduction is not appropriate
  - Leaving load pockets as a specific problem aside (not market design issue), the discussion is about real underinvestment in an integrated bilateral wholesale market, and again about who were to decide the adequate level of reserve margins

# Summary III

- Third session is about market integration and intermittency
  - Coordination via price signals (nodal pricing)
  - Price areas to reflect all substitutable markets (from balancing, to non standard bilateral contracts, to standard base, peak; spot and forward)
  - Is the market design biased in favor of standard spot and forward contracts, whereas intermittent generation, if marketed, acts on different markets (closer to real time)